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CASE COMMENTS

CASE COMMENTS
INTOXICATING LIQUORS-GiVING LIQUOR TO ANOTHER-LEGIS-

LATIVE DisCRETION.-In Commonwealtk v. Wells the defendant
was indicted for unlawfully giving to another person one-fourth
of a pint of intoxicating liquor, not for medicinal, mechanical,
scientific or sacramental purposes. The lower court sustained
a demurrer to the indictment on the ground that it did not
charge a public offense-that -it is not unlawful for a person to
give away a drink of liquor.
On this appeal two questions are addressed to the court:
First, does the charge in this indictment come within the inhibition of the stiatute; and, second, if it does, is it competent
for the state to prohibit one of its citizens from giving intoxicating liquor, in any quantity, to another, not under condition of the Act?
In answer to the first question the court held that the giving
by one person to another of any amount, of intoxicating liquor
is within the inhibition of the Act of 1920, which provides that
it shall be unlawful to manufacture, sell, barter, give away ox
keep for sale or transportation, spintuous, vinous, malt or intoxicating liquors except for sacTanental, medicinal, scientific
or mechanical purposes in the Commonwealth of Kentucky.
The court then said: "The only allowable exception to the language of the Act in section 8, which provides that nothingin
this Act shall be construed so as to make it unlawful to possess
liquors in one's private dwelling house, while same is occupied
and used by him as his dwelling only, and such liquor need not
be reported, provided such liquors are for the use only for the
personal consumption of the owner thereof and his family ,residing in such dwelling, and for -his bona fide guests when entertained by him therein." And then it is further prqvided.
that in any action concerning such liquor, the burden of proof.
shall be on the possessor to prove -thatit was lawfully acquired,
possessed and used.
The court then held that',the seventh amendment f'tthe Constitdtion of Kentucky, -prohibiting the maiufactffte, sale or
transportation of -intoxicating liquors, does not res et the
power of the legislature, in',deaing with the subject -of.in xo
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eating liquors, to the enactment of such laws only as enforce the
constitutional provision, but leaves to the legislature a reasonable discretion in the selection of the method and means of prohibiting the use of intoxicating liquors.
The legislature -has the inherent power to legislate on any
subject affecting the morals of its citizens, and as a logical aid
to the prohibition of fthe manufacture, sale and transportation
of intoxicating liquors for beverage purposes, it is competent
for the legislature to enact a law prohibiting the giving by one
person to another of intoxicating liquor, and such an act is not
invalid as an infringement on the personal liberty of the citizen,
or as a deprivation of his right to use and dispose of his own
property as he chooses. Commonwealt v. Wells, October 27,
1922, 196 Ky. 262.
C.H.L.
PARENT AND

CHILD-STATUTE REGARDING ABANDONMENT

CmLu DOES NOT INCLUDE BASTARD

OF

CHIiLD.-Where a parent

abandons an infant bastard child, refusing to provide for its
support, he is not liable under the statute providing for the
punishment for child desertion.
Section 331i-I Ky. Statutes provides that where the parent
in this Commonwealth abandons his child leaving it destitute
he shall be punished by fine and imprisonment.
Section 174 provides for the support by a father of his bastard child. According to a long line of cases in England and
in this country, where the wvorld "child" is used it means a
legitimate child and not a bastard unless expressly designated
or circumstances or necessary implication is .to the contrary. 7
Ves. 458; 31 Oh. D. 542. Gardner v. Heyer, 2 Paige (N. Y.)
II; Heater v. Van Auken, 14 N. J. Eq. 159.
Since there was already a provision for the support of a
bastard child before the statute in question, and since this statute is of a highly penal nature, the court construes it strictly,
and holds the word "child" as used in the statute to mean
legitimate child and not a 'bastard. Commonwealth v. Ray, 196
Ky. 203. October 24. 1922.
J. S. C.
TAXATION-CONSTRUCTION
OMITTEI

PROPERTY-WHAT

OF STATUTES ON ASSESSMENT OF
CONSTITUTES A TERM

oF COURT.-

Where the property to be assessed is omitted and it becomes
the duty of the revenue agent or sheriff, to assess the property;
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held progressive steps must be taken in the proceeding during
the period of two terms of court next following.
This statute is subject to a liberal construction and a term
of court is so considered within the meaning of the statute when
the judge presides and transaets business regardless of the
length of the term.
The ad valorem tax must be paid on all oil leases and in
addition .the license tax as provided in Statute 4223c-I shall be
assessed and is within the meaning of See. 181 of the constitution. Rayhue v. Board of Supervisors, 183 Ky. 84. The word
property means all property capable of a sale at a fair market
price and is subject to taxation whether on the schedule of the
assessor or not. (Ibid.)
Under See. 4260, sub. 6, Caroll's Statutes, 1922, when no
progressive steps are taken under a case, as in see. I, within
two terms of court it shall be the duty of the judge to dismiss
the case.
The question now arises, what constitutes a term of court
within the meaning of the statute supra? The above statute
has been held constitutional in the case of Commonwealth v.
Ewald Iron Co., 153 Ky. 116; Same v. Sihmidt, 165 Ky. 351.
The statte is clearly remedial and shall be construed liberally as opposed to the common law rule. See. 460, Ky. Statutes.
See. 964 of the statutes provides that a term of court in any
district may be extended. It must be concluded therefore that
where -the judge presides over the court and transacts business,
this is a term of court, for it Fias been universally the practice
to adjourn court at intervals. The judge is not required to be
present -and hold court every day of the prescribed term to constitute a term in which business such as referred to in See. 4260,
sub. 6 may be transacted and a failure to transact such business
gives the defendant a right to move for dismissal. The word
"term," when used with reference to a court signifies the space
of time during which the court holds a session. 15 Corpus
Juris 884. Black's Law Dict. 1145, Bouvier's Diet. 1109.
Wood Oil Co. v. Commonwealth, by etc., 196 Ky. 196, June 23,
1922. United Oi I Co. v. Same. TidalO il Co. v. Same. .ederal Oil Co. v. Same. Associated Producersv. Same. J. S. .
LEvY oF CAPrrATiON TAx ny FiscAL COURT-SCHOOL BoAnD
MAY ORDER AMOUNT To BE I!Evmo-Where the school board
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properly demanded a capitation and ad valorem tax levy of
one dollar on all legal voters under Act of General Assembly
1920, Chap. 36, See. 8, submitting a budget, the fiscal court refused on the grounds: (1) that capitation tax must be as provided by Chap. 7, Acts of General Assembly 1922, on "all male
citizens above 21" instead of " all legal voters," (2) that the
fiscal court may determine its necessity and the Act is discretionary, (3) that the Act of 1920 is unconstitutional, violating
Sees. 51 and 180 of the Constitution. Held that the Acts of
1920 apply; the Act is highly mandatory and is constitutional.
Through -a long line of cases -the court has held firmly that a
county school board -having fulfilled the proper requirements,
may present a budget to the fiscal couxt showing the amount
needed, and the purpose for which it is desired. When -his is
done the fiscal court has no discretion in the matter, but must
grant the tax demanded so -long as it is within the constitutional
limitations.
Breathitt County Fiscal Court v. Breathitt County Board of
Education, 191 Ky. 66, holds that the levy may be made regardless of explaining specific purposes for which the funds
are to be used.
This case further establishes the rule that the 'board of education may dictate the amount of capitation tax, 'being sole judge
of its needs when the budget in detail is submitted.
The fiscal court in this ease argued that the Act of 1922,
Chap. 7 applies, but the Act of 1920 became effective many
months prior to the Act of 1922 and is unaffected by the later
Act. The Act of 1920 provides "for the levying of tax for
common school purposes in each county" and this is construed
to mean an ad valorem tax and capitation tax, each being germane to -the other and capable of being enforced if necessary to
meet the requirements of the budget.
As to the constitutionality of this act See. 180 of the Constitution provides that every legislative act, ordinance or resolution "levying a tax shall specify the distinct purpose for which
said tax is levied and no tax levied and collected for one purpse shall ever be donated for another purpose," but the Act
provides that the money collected shall be a.pplied according
to the provisions of the budget, which.-isplainly within the
meaning of the Constitution, and the fiscal court has no further
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discretion. FiscalCourt-of Jefferson County v. Jefferson County
J. S. C.
Board of Education, 196 Ky. 212. Oct. 24, 1922.
TROVER AND CowERsION.-The -Cable Company of Chicago,
sold the appellee a piano on the installment plan, taking his
promissory note for the amount. The appellee executed a chattel mortgage on the piano to the company to secure the payment of the note. Two years later the company agreed to repair the piano, which was sent to them in Chicago. After the
repairs were made, the company demanded the balance due on
the piano before they would return it. The appellee refused
to make the payment in full, as demanded. The company refused to return the chattel -and this action was instituted.
The court held in this case where a momtgagee by artifice
or trickery obtains possession'of the m ortgaged property ostensibly for one purpose and thereafter asserts the right to retain
such possession for -another reason, then the mortgagor may
maintain an action for conversion.
It was also held in regard to -the measure of damages that,
without regard to the original price of the mortgaged property
or the amount of payments thereon, the measure of recovery
because of the alleged wrongful conversion is the value of the
thing converted at the time of its conversion with interest in
the discretion of the jury, upon the amount found less the
amount of the lien thereon by the defendant with interest according to the terms of the contract. The Cable Company v.
0. W. C.
Greenfild, 196 Ky. 314.
WIEN
TERM OF IMPRISONMENT BEGiN.-One Drowrns was
convicted of the offense of chicken stealing, on November 25,
1921, and his punishment fixed at confinement in the penitentiary for the period of one year. He entered no -motion for a
new trial, but the court did not sentence him nor render judgment upon the verdict until December 23, 1921. On September 22, 1922, -hefiled ta petition before the county judge of Lyon
County, praying for a writ of habeas corpus -tobe issued.
The case was appealed and the question arose as to when
the term of imprisonment began. The court held that the term
of imprisonment of a convict in the penitenti a ry does not begin with the verdict of the jury, but cannot begin earlier than
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the date of the rendition of -the judgment upon the verdict.
Commonwealth, on relation, etc. v. Gresham, County Judge,
etc., 196 Ky. 27.
0. W. C.
INTOXICATmNG LIQUoRs-ARRrsT WiTHouT WAwq -AcciiDENTAL KILLING BY PROHIITON ENFORCEMENT O cCic.-An

officer of the United States government as well as s9tate officers
engaged 'in the enforcement of the probibition laws has no right
to arrest an individual driving an automobile or to search his
car for liquors, unless such officer has a warmant so to do, or
the liquors are exposed to view, and the officers thus obtain the
information, in which event he.has the right and it is his duty
to make the arrest.
Where an officer.in good faith attempts to apprehend a person under suspicion of having in his car moonshine liquors and
the person attempts to escape in -his car but ds overtaken and
brought to a stop and is directed to get out of his car and put
up his hands, and thereafter, while the attention of the officer
is called in another directioii, the accused person attempts to
escape and the officer tells him he will have to handcuff him,
and with a pistol in his hand directs fhe alleged offender to put
forth his arms to receive the htandeuffs and the offender resists
and in the struggle which ensued the pistol is discharged, taking effect in the head of the accused,' fatally wounding him; it
was not proper for the court -toperemptorily -instruct the jury
that the officer had a right to make such an arrest without a
warrant, especially in view of the fact that there was no evidence
tending to show 'that the officer or any of his posse knew for a
certainty that the automobile which the accused wes hiving
contained liquors and that he was violating the prohibition laws

in their presence.
A prohibition enforcement officer may make an arrest of any
person who s unlawfully transporting liquor in his presence if
the fact be known to -theofficer; but if said fact be not known
to him and his attempt to arrest is based alone upon suspicion,
the officer is not entitled on a trial for shooting and wounding
to an instruction that he had a right to make such an arrest
without a warrant. Montfort v. Commonwealth, 196 Ky. 104J. L. B.
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RAiLROADS--INJURMS TO PERSONS ON TRcxKs-TREsPASSERS
-LCENSEE-COMPANY

NOT LIABLE

FOR

ACCIDENT OCCURRING

DURING PERIOD OF FEDERAL CONTRoL.-While plaintiff's intes-

-

tate was walking along or near the track of the defendant railway company, she was struck and killed by a train which was
being operated by the Director General of :Railroads. The question for decision was whether or not plaintiff's decedent was
a licensee to whom those operating the train owed a duty of
giving a warning and keeping a lookout. On the trial it was
stated by people of that neigbborhood that from ten to thirty
people traveled over that road daily, some walking and some
riding horseback, and that the road had been so used by the
public for some time.
It was 'held that -a railroad may be used by small numbers
over a long period of time and yet they may not acquire a
license. The rule is that in order to convert -trespassers into
licensees -it is necessary that the track be -habitually used by the
public in such -large 'numbers that the presence of persons on
the track should be anticipated. The number using this road
was not large enough to make them licensees.
It was also held that a railroad company is not liable for
damages for negligence arising out of the operation of the road
during Federal control.
This case under consideration upholds the decisions of the
past in the Kentucky courts.
In the case of Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. v. Dawson's Adm'r,
159 Ky. 296, 167 S. W. 225, it was held that the question as to
whether one struck by a train was a trespasser or a licensee
while on the track does not depend on the fact that the accident
happened in a city or incorporated town, but on the number of
persons using the track at the place of the accident. It was
left as a question for the jury to decide whether or not one hundred persons using the road made those walking over the road
licensees.
Louisvile & N. _B. Co. v. Redmon's Adm'x, 122 Ky. 385, 91
S. W. 722, held, where the light of way on which the plaintiff's decedent was killed was not parallel to an adjoining street,
but was entirely enclosed to prevent its use by the public, its
use by a few sometimes pawing that way did not amount to a
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license. Louisville & N. B. Co., et al. v. Bank's Adm'r, 195
J. B. N.
Ky, 804. Oct. 3, 1922.
TAxATION-TAx SAIES-EVIDNCE AS TO REGULAnrTY AND
VALiDITy OF AuDiTo's DflD.-In an action to recover land, the

petitioner claimed under a ,deed executed by-the auditor on a
sale made by a revenue agent. Judgment was rendered dismissing the petition and plaintiff appeals.
The first point taken by the appellant was that on the introduction of the tax deed he was entitled to a peremptory instruction. The court held that though the statute makes a tax
deed prima facie evidence of the regularity of the tax sale, the
presumption of regularity may 'be overcome by proof. Kentucky Statutes, see. 4030; Anderson v. Daugherty, 169 Ky. 308.
The ground on which the tax deed was assailed by the appellee was that the land was sold privately and not publicly as
required by the statute, see. 4154. The evidence shows that
when the land was offered at public outcry, neither the appellant nor anyone else bid on it. But, on the .contrary, the appellant bought another tract and later, learning that the owner
of that tract had a receipt for the taxes, went to the agent who
returned his money. He then looked over the list of prope-ty
advertised for sale and told the agent that he would take the
land in controversy. Held, such evidence was admissible and
showed clearly -that this was a private sale, 'and therefore, in-valid, and a deed made pursuant thereto passed no title. Kentucky Staitutes, see. 4154; Brown's Executrix v. Green, 184 Ky.
C. 1H. L.
300; Grays v. Mills, 196 Ky. 122. Oct. 17, 1922.

SEARCHES An SE=zES-EVDsNCE OBTAINED UNDER INSEARcH WAmmNT.--Defendant was arrested for unlaw-

vALiD

fully having in his possession intoxicating liquor for the purpose of sale. The affidavit on which the seaeh warrant was
issued was made out by two police officers. The act of the legislature of March 23, 1920, provided that such an affidavit must
be made out by a state or federal officer and one reputable
citizen, or by two reputable citizens.' Therefore the defendant
contended that since this affldavit was not sumfeient on its face
to show probable cause. for the issuance of the warrant, as provided by the act of.Maxah2,. 1920, tie lower court erred in al-
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lowing his conviction from evidence obtained under an illegal
search warrant.
At trial the warrant was put in evidence but was objected to
as being illegal *andnot admissible as evidence. This objection was overruled and the warrant read. The Commonwealth
was then allowed to introduce a witness and prove by him that
in making the search certain liquor was found, all of which was
put in evidence without objection by the defendant.
The court held that evidence obtained under an illegal warrant was inadmissible. Price v. Commonwealth, and Cooley
and Crawford v. Commonwealthb, decided by the Court of Appeals, Sept. 26, 1922. The rule of evidence in this state applicaible ,in the ease was stated by the court -to be, "The competency of the evidence must be drawn in question and, unless
objection is made to it at the time it is offered, it will be admitted and considered as competent."
The defendant did object to the admission of the search
warrant and moved that it be quashed. The court held that
the lower court could not quash an invalid search warrant alxeady executed. It is the evidence obtained by it and not the
warrant that is incompetent. Price v. Commonwealth, supra.
Therefore, though the liquor was not competent as evidence to
prove the guilt of defendant, in the light of the rule of evidence given above, it became competent when the defendant
permitted it to be introduced without objection. Dukes v. Commonwealtk, 196 Ky. 60. Oct. 13, 1922.
R. 0. S.

